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a similar statute is in force, or where filing or recording of the chattel
mortgage or conditional sale contract is constructive notice, in the major-
ity of jurisdictions, the only methods suggested for protecting the vendor
of personal property, that will be affixed to realty, are to take a real
estate mortgage of the property, properly recorded, Brennan v. Whit-
aker, supra; Tibbets v. Horne, supra, or to perfect a lien upon it under
the Mechanics' Lien Law. Garven v. Hogue & Donaldson, 14 W. L.
Bull 175 (Ohio C.C. 1885).
Although a mechanic's lien would afford protection for the erecting
of fixtures upon property, it would not create a lien upon the separate
articles for the purchase price. Ohio G.C. 831o. The suggestion in the
Ohio cases, Brennan v. Whitaker, supra; Garven v. Hogue & David-
son, supra, of perfecting a lien upon fixtures by a real estate mortgage,
while affording security to the vendor against a subsequent mortgagee,
is, in effect, precluding the use of conditional sale contracts of articles
affixed to the realty. In the writer's opinion, there is a real need for
legislation similar to Section 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
2 U.L.A. 12, providing constructive notice to subsequent mortgagees
or purchasers, by filing the contract in the office of the records of realty.
With such a statute, in case of doubt whether the property, as affixed, is
a chattel or fixture, the vendor could file two contracts, just as he can




LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS FOR UNEMPLOY-
MENT INSURANCE
With the enactment of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act
(Ohio Gen. Code 1345-1-1345-35), the municipalities of this state
have been faced with a perplexing situation. The Act, in providing for
exemptions, has defined the term employment as not including "service
performed in the employ of any governmental unit, municipal or public
corporation, political subdivision, or instrumentality of the United States
or of one or more states or political subdivisions in the exercise of purely
governmental functions." In thus dealing with the government em-
ployee Ohio has adopted an unique course; the other states have in all
instances framed their statutes so as to give complete exemption to
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employees of federal, state, and municipal governments. The limitation
of the exemption, in Ohio, to employees of governmental units engaged
in purely governmental functions has resulted in a problem of no little
consequence to the municipalities of the state, faced as they have been
in the last several years with a struggle ot keep within budgets already
strained to the limit.
Faced with the problem of interpreting the scope of the statutory
exemption, the Unemployment Commission, chiefly on the basis of
Opinion No. 1O69 of the Attorney-General, finally concluded that
employees in the following departments were exempt: Police, fire,
health, street cleaning and maintenance, sewage disposal, sewer construc-
tion, garbage and waste collection as a health measure, and hospitals.
The contrary was concluded as to employees connected with light plants,
auditoriums, markets, stadiums, garbage collection and disposal as a
revenue measure, cemeteries, operation and upkeep of sewers, parks and
public property, and waterworks. Issue was joined especially on water-
works, the cities contending that the employees thereof were exempt
from the act because engaged not in a proprietary, but in a purely gov-
ernmental function. Subsequently the Attorney-General, in Opinion
No. 134I, reaffirmed his previous decision, holding such employees to be
within the scope of act.
Unsuccessful in this approach, the municipalities then shifted the
argument to a technical one of the proper construction of the exemption
clause itself, claiming that the phrase "in the exercise of purely govern-
mental functions" modified the word "instrumentality" only. This con-
tention they based upon the grammatical construction of the exemption
clause, reinforced by the theory that since the instrumentalities of gov-
ernment may exercise either governmental or proprietary functions, the
qualifying phrase has clear meaning in relation to the use of the word
"instrumentality," and, therefore, that employees coming under other
divisions of the clause are not within the act regardless of whether or
not such employees are engaged in "purely governmental functions".
Quite recently the Attorney-General, in Opinion No. 1769, dealing
with enforcement of the act against federal agencies, took occasion to
answer this contention with the contrary one that the qualifying phrase
modifies the entire subsection. But while representing the most recent
development in the problem, and undeniably carrying difficulties of its
own, this matter of the proper reading of the provision seems to be but
a temporary phase of the underlying struggle over the question of what
constitutes "governmental" and what "proprietary" in relation to specific
functions now carried on by Ohio municipalities.
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In support of their position the cities have relied heavily upon the
case of Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U.S. 352, 575
Sup. Ct. 495, 81 Law Ed. 691 (937), which involved the power of
Congress to tax an employee of the New York City Municipal Water
Supply. The Court, through Mr. Justice Sutherland, there held that
such an employee was not subject to the federal income tax, declaring
also that the cases on tort liability are not authoritative in the field, and
incidentally dismissed the test of using the presence or absence of profit
as a factor in determining the classification of a particular function as
governmental or proprietary. The Attorney-General and, through him,
the Commission, on the other hand have looked for guidance to the
principles controlling municipal liability in tort; this seems clear both
from the Attorney-General's specific reliance upon some of the Ohio
cases in this field and from the high degree of correlation between the
rulings above indicated and the Ohio decisions as a whole. Analysis of
these decisions on tort liability of cities reveals that in the construction
and operation of public utilities, such as light power and heating plants,
and water works, municipalities are deemed to act in their private or pro-
prietary capacities. City of Piqua v. Morris, 98 Ohio St. 42, 127 N.E.
300 (1918); City of Salem v. Harding, 121 Ohio St. 412, 169 N.E.
457 (1927), dictum. This view was clearly embraced in the dictum
contained in the late case of City of Niles v. Union Ice Corp., 133
Ohio St. 169 (1938), which decision was announced almost a year
after the Brush case was handed down. So also have the courts of Ohio
held the following to be proprietary in nature: Cemeteries, City of
Toledo v. Cone, 41 Ohio St. 149 (1884); operation and upkeep of
sewers, City of Portsmouth v. Mitchell Manufacturing Co., 113 Ohio
St. 250, 148 N.E. 846 (1935); markets, City of Wooster v. .drbenz,
116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927), dictum. The bases of such
holdings are that such functions are not supported out of the general
funds, nor are they necessary to the safety, welfare and health of the
general public, and that with the exception of the operation of sewers
the services are in part at least in competition with private business.
On the other hand the Ohio decisions point to the conclusion that
the following functions are deemed governmental: parks, Selden v. City
of Cuyahoga Falls, 132 Ohio St. 223, 6 N.E. (2d) 976 (937); City
of Cleveland v. Walker, 52 Ohio App. 477, 3 N.E. (2d) 990 (1936);
sewer construction, City of Salem v. Harding, 121 Ohio St. 412
169 N.E. 457 (1929); hospitals, Lloyd v. City of Toledo, 42 Ohio
App. 36, 18o N.E. 716 (1931); garbage collection and disposal,
State ex rel. Moock v. City of Cincinnati, 120 Ohio St. 500, 166 N.E.
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583 ( 1929); Sarley v. City of Cleveland, 30 Ohio Law Rep. 640
(1929); collection of ashes, Shilling v. City of Cincinnati, 22 Ohio
C. C. (N.S.) 526 (915); maintenance of streets and highways, City
of lVooster v. Ilrbenz, ii6 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927); see
Hamiltoz v. Dille, 120 Ohio St. 127, I65 N.E. 715 (1929); and
street cleaning, City of Akron v. Butler, io8 Ohio St. 122 (1923).
Thus in only one situation has there been a departure from the admin-
istrative policy of interpreting the exemption clause in the light of the
tort liability cases; though the operation of parks is, in Ohio, deemed
governmental so far as liability for tort is concerned, the Attorney-
General and the Commission have declared it to be proprietary for the
purpose of the Unemployment Insurance Act.
This divergency in the approach of the cities on the one hand and
the state enforcement officials on the other poses this question: Which of
the two approaches is the most pertinent in interpreting the exemption
clause? In considering the propriety of the instrumentality analogy it
is important to note that the theory therein is concerned with the opti-
mum relation of one sovereign to another in a dual form of government.
The underlying theory therein looks to an altogether different prob-
lem; consequently, the use of such an analogy in attempting to set a
standard in the problem under discussion seems inapplicable. As a basis
of comparison, the analogy to the tort cases comes much closer, for the
tort field deals with the relation between government and the individual,
where, as here, the municipality is engaged in various lines of activity.
Indeed, in the interpretation of the exemption provision of the Un-
employment Insurance Act there is much to be said in support of even
stricter delimitation of the scope of the term governmental than has been
made in the tort liability cases. Support for such a view can be found
both in the legislature's use of the restrictive word "purely" in the exemp-
tion subsection and in recent legislation on the matter of municipal
liability in tort. For the statutes have gone beyond decisions of the
courts and as a result have imposed liability in fields presumed to be
governmental. By Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 3714 liability is imposed with
respect to street maintenance; while Sec. 3714-I imposes liability upon
cities for the acts of its servants in the operation of vehicles upon the
public highways, save only in the case of police and fire department
activities.
Furthermore, as "state socialism" gains ground, and as municipal
corporations expand continually into those activities which were once
considered the area of private enterprise, it seems not only reasonable
but necessary to impose in such situations the same business costs upon
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the government as are placed upon the private employer. See Borchard,
"Government Liability in Tort," 34 Yale L. J. 129 (1924). Such a
tendency is already marked in the field of Workmen's Compensation
wherein employees of state and municipal units are afforded protection
against accident. The expected result is that the double standard implicit
in the ancient concept of immunity of government has become increas-
ingly untenable. In the words of Judge Wanamaker contained in Fow-
ler v. City of Cleveland, IOO Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (i919): "The
whole doctrine of immunity given to a sovereign state was based upon
the assumption of the divine right of kings-a king can do no wrong,
he is infallible, or, if he do wrong, no subject has any right to complain.
This doctrine has been shot to death on so many different battlefields
that it would seem utter folly now to resurrect it, even by the judgment
of a court of last resort."
ROBERT G. ROSENBERG
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
RECOVERY BY DRAWEE BANK OF PAYMENT ON A CHECK WITH
FORGED INDORSEMENTS
Defendant bank, a purchaser for value, indorsed guaranting prior
restrictive indorsements and received payment of a check drawn by the
plaintiff on itself payable to four payees. The indorsements of three of
the payees were forged by the fourth. The plaintiff brought an action
for the recovery of the money paid out on the check. Held: the plaintiff
may recover unless precluded because of waiver, estoppel, or laches on its
part. Whether recovery is barred is a jury question. State Planters Bank
& Trust Co. of Richmond, Va. v. Fifth-Third Union Trust Co. of
Cincinnati, 56 Ohio App. 309, IO N.E. (2d) 935 (1937)-
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was passed by the Ohio
legislature in 1902. Only a few of the many questions which may arise
under the act have been passed on by our appellate courts. Heretofore
there has been no direct adjudication by any Ohio appellate court on
the question of the right to the recovery of payment by the drawee on
an instrument with a forged indorsement although the question arose in
the Provident Savings Bank v. The Fifth-Third Union Trust Co., 43
Ohio App. 533, 183 N.E. 885 (1932). In that case it was unnecessary
to directly pass on the question as the drawee was held unable to recover
on other grounds.
